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ABSTRACT
Recently, foreign policy in the United States has shifted its focus to a
return to “great power competition,” reflecting the rising challenges posed
by potential competitor nations such as China and Russia. The combination
of economic integration with and actions by these countries, especially
China, has exposed weaknesses in U.S. corporate law that, if unaddressed,
threaten to undermine the security and foreign policy of the U.S. Foreign
shareholders own an increasing share of U.S. companies’ equity, which
opens the possibility of shareholder votes being used to advance strategic
interests of foreign governments. Current legal safeguards against
potentially threatening foreign investment, such as the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), currently lack both the
legal authority and practical ability to safeguard U.S. companies from
potentially malicious interference in shareholder voting. Expanding CFIUS
authority to temporarily restrict voting rights from certain shareholders in
sensitive industries and countries would safeguard the interests of U.S.
shareholders and U.S. foreign policy.
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INTRODUCTION
From 1947 to 1991, the United States and its allies engaged in
geopolitical conflict with the Soviet Union and its satellite states, a conflict
known as the Cold War. Many observers believed the end of the Cold War
and collapse of the Soviet Union would usher in a new period of international
cooperation and peace.1 While the years immediately after the fall of the
Soviet Union may have satisfied some of these predictions, recent history
has demonstrated that international competition continues to be a defining
force of today’s geopolitics.
Russia, under Vladimir Putin, has begun asserting its military strength

1. See Thomas Wright, The Return to Great-Power Rivalry was Inevitable, THE
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Sep. 12, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-return-togreat-power-rivalry-was-inevitable/ [https://perma.cc/MTW3-RLEE] (arguing that “[i]n the
1990s and 2000s, American leaders believed that Russia and China were converging with the
West on basic questions of world order. Countries would work together on common
challenges while old geopolitical rivalries would matter much less.”). See also Hal Brands,
Six Propositions about Great-Power Competition and Revisionism in the 21st Century, THE
FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL ORDER COLLOQUIUM (2017), https://global.upenn.edu/sites/default/fi
les/go-six-propositions-brands.original.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4H6-GD3Y] (suggesting that
“the great hope of the post-Cold War era was that ideological convergence would lead to great
power peace”).
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in Ukraine2 and the Middle East.3 China has asserted itself militarily in the
South China Sea4 and economically across the globe.5 Some rogue
governments have continued to sponsor terrorism6 and hack into U.S.
government and commercial databases.7 International competition is very
much alive.
U.S. companies are not immune from this competition. China, in its
pursuit of global leadership, has engaged in behavior that threatens both U.S.
interests and the success of U.S. companies. U.S. corporations have long
complained about poor intellectual property protection in China and being
forced to transfer their technology to Chinese state-owned companies in
exchange for access to the Chinese market.8 While China denies this,9 this
2. See, e.g., Steven Lee Meyers and Ellen Barry, Putin Reclaims Crimea for Russia and
Bitterly Denounces the West, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014
/03/19/world/europe/ukraine.html [https://perma.cc/9CW7-U337] (reporting Putin’s
announcement of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014); Patrick Reevell, Russia extends
detention of captured Ukrainian sailors, ABC NEWS (Jan. 15, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com
/beta-story-container/International/russia-brings-captured-ukrainian-sailors-court/story?id=6
0398214 [https://perma.cc/7NJU-CTKP] (reporting that Russia continues to detain captured
Ukrainian sailors despite protests from Ukraine and the West); Tom Embury-Dennis, Ukraine
could soon cease to be a country, Russia’s top security official says, THE INDEPENDENT (Jan.
16. 2019), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-russia-country-conflic
t-war-crimea-nikolai-patrushev-a8730476.html [https://perma.cc/TF26-ZPKE] (reporting
that Russia’s top security official has warned that Ukraine could soon lose statehood).
3. See, e.g., Liz Sly, In the Middle East, Russia is Back, THE WASHINGTON POST (Dec.
5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-the-middle-east-russia-is-back/2018/12
/04/e899df30-aaf1-11e8-9a7d-cd30504ff902_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9a1f6bf
35fe2 [https://perma.cc/9UUX-6J3H] (recounting recent expansion of Russian military,
political, and economic action in the Middle East).
4. See Travis Fedchun, China builds new platform on reef in South China Sea, satellite
photos show, FOX NEWS (Nov. 22, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/world/china-buildingon-new-reef-in-south-china-sea-satellite-photos-show
[https://perma.cc/4KN2-YWAN]
(describing China’s effort to build artificial islands for military use in the South China Sea).
5. See Lily Kuo and Niko Kommenda, What is China’s Belt and Road Initiative?, THE
GUARDIAN (July 30, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/jul/30/w
hat-china-belt-road-initiative-silk-road-explainer
[https://perma.cc/WUB9-RZ9D]
(describing China’s multibillion-dollar Belt and Road initiative and plans to expand its global
economic influence).
6. BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM (2019).
7. NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE & SEC. CTR., FOREIGN ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE IN
CYBERSPACE 5-11 (2018), https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/news/20180724-econ
omic-espionage-pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/697F-38TA].
8. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE: EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, UPDATE CONCERNING CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION (2018), https://ustr.gov
/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/301%20Report%20Update.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/BPJ5-4VPL].
9. Tom Miles, U.S. and China Clash over ‘Technology Transfer’ at WTO, REUTERS
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interference is especially problematic in light of China’s Made in China 2025
initiative10 and ongoing trade dispute with the U.S.11 Additionally, evidence
has recently surfaced of the Chinese government conducting corporate
espionage on U.S. companies and government organizations through
supplier relationships with large U.S. companies,12 and the U.S. continues to
accuse the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei of having the
capability to use, if not using, its communications equipment to spy on other
nations, companies, or individuals.13
China has also sought to use corporate law as one of its weapons.
Throughout 2015 and 2016, the Chinese financial services conglomerate
Anbang Insurance Group, which has close ties to the Chinese government,14
sought to take control of the U.S. hotel chain Starwood Hotels,
International.15 Anbang retreated from the deal after concerns emerged that
U.S. national security regulators may not approve the deal, or may require
certain divestments before approval.16 But in 2018, Starwood, then part of
(May 28, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china/u-s-and-china-clash-ove
r-technology-transfer-at-wto-idUSKCN1IT11G [https://perma.cc/3X2P-WDCY].
10. For a summary of the economic implications of China 2025 Initiative for the U.S.,
see WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE MADE IN CHINA 2025 INITIATIVE:
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES (2018).
11. US-China Officials Begin Trade War Talks in Beijing, BBC NEWS (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-46778189 [https://perma.cc/YQC8-VYJM]; See also
William Mauldin, Lingling Wei, and Alex Leary, U.S., China Agree to Limited Deal to Halt
Trade War, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/us-china-confirmreaching-phase-one-trade-deal-11576234325 [https://perma.cc/F26P-LTZL].
12. Jordan Robertson and Michael Riley, The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip
to Infiltrate U.S. Companies, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.bloom
berg.com/news/features/2018-10-04/the-big-hack-how-china-used-a-tiny-chip-to-infiltrateamerica-s-top-companies [https://perma.cc/422U-W3QS].
13. Julian E. Barnes, White House Official Says Huawei Has Secret Back Door to Extract
Data, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/11/us/politics/whitehouse-huawei-back-door.html [https://perma.cc/J9B5-9DT8].
14. Chao Deng and James T. Areddy, China Confirms It Transferred Ownership of
Anbang Insurance to Government, WALL ST. J. (June 22, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/ar
ticles/china-confirms-it-transferred-ownership-of-anbang-insurance-to-government-15296
74446 [https://perma.cc/K77S-LKED].
15. Craig Karmin and Joshua Jamerson, Starwood Gets Higher Offer from Anbang-led
Group, Threatening Marriott Deal, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articl
es/starwood-gets-higher-offer-from-anbang-threatening-marriott-deal-1459173151
[https://perma.cc/E572-LMNF].
16. Michael J. de la Merced and Leslie Picker, Starwood Bidding War Ends Abruptly,
Yielding a Merger and a Puzzle, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/201
6/04/01/business/dealbook/starwood-hotels-chinese-suitor-backs-out-of-bidding.html [https:
//perma.cc/4RBJ-KJHU]. See also Steven Davidoff Solomon, If Starwood Makes a Deal with
Anbang, Can It Be Done?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/3
1/business/dealbook/if-starwood-makes-a-deal-with-anbang-can-it-be-done.html [https://per
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Marriott International, was discovered to have been the victim of a hacking
attempt, which cybersecurity experts have identified as being perpetrated by
the Chinese government.17 While no definitive evidence has been publicly
revealed, it is possible that when the attempt to gain control over Starwood’s
data via corporate law mechanisms (in this case, an acquisition) failed, the
Chinese government resorted to hacking Starwood in order to obtain the data
they desired. If so, this would be one potential example of a competitive
foreign power seeking to use U.S. corporate law to pursue its own interests.18
A new weakness in U.S. corporate law is emerging. Left unaddressed,
it could become detrimental to the U.S. national security apparatus. Foreign
holdings of U.S. equities have risen from $2.4 trillion in 2006 to a record
$7.2 trillion in 2017.19 The share of U.S. equities owned by foreign investors
has increased from less than 9% in 2006 to nearly 15% in 2018.20 Research
has found that by 2050, many U.S. companies will be majority-owned by
ma.cc/96BM-NHSG] (arguing that CFIUS may require divestiture of certain hotels to approve
the transaction), and David Eisen, Opaque Anbang draws more questions over U.S. buying
spree, HOTEL MGMT. (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.hotelmanagement.net/own/opaque-anba
ng-draws-more-questions-over-u-s-buying-spree [https://perma.cc/6BXR-RUNV] (citing a
series of calls to use CFIUS to investigate Anbang acquisitions of U.S. hotels) and Letter from
Senator Claire McCaskill, Ranking Member of the Comm. on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, to Adam J. Szubin, Acting Sec’y, Treasury (Feb. 8, 2017), https://ww
w.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-02-08%20Letter%20to%20Treasury%20requestin
g%20CIFUS%20plans%20re%20Trump%20financial%20interests.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4
G5-7YK8] (noting the belief among certain senators that CFIUS approval contributed to
Anbang’s retreat from the Marriott deal).
17. Ellen Nakashima and Craig Timberg, U.S. investigators point to China in Marriott
hack affecting 500 million guests, THE WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.was
hingtonpost.com/technology/2018/12/12/us-investigators-point-china-marriott-hack-affectin
g-million-travelers/?utm_term=.accda2dff76b [https://perma.cc/RC78-S5VQ].
18. China’s use of corporate law to advance its strategic interests has also attracted the
attention of U.S. policymakers. See, e.g., Mitt Romney, Mitt Romney: America is Awakening
to China. This is a Clarion Call to Seize the Moment., THE WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 23, 2020
3:25 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/mitt-romney-covid-19
-has-exposed-chinas-utter-dishonesty/2020/04/23/30859476-8569-11ea-ae26-989cfce1c7c7
_story.html [https://perma.cc/5UCJ-MZ2Z]. See also Alfred Cang and Mark Burton, China’s
Tsingshan Helped Drive Record Drop in Nickel Inventories, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 8, 2019
12:19 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-08/china-s-tsingshan-helped
-drive-record-drop-in-nickel-inventories [https://perma.cc/K6EY-VPSB], and Bernadette
Christina and Wilda Asmarini, Indonesian nickel miners to stop ore exports immediately,
REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2019 6:47 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-nickel/indo
nesian-nickel-miners-agree-to-stop-ore-exports-immediately-investment-chief-idUSKBN1X
7106 [https://perma.cc/2W9R-3R49].
19. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY: FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, FOREIGN
PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES 6 (2018), http://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/shla20
18r.pdf [https://perma.cc/4364-5JNU].
20. Id.
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foreign investors.21 The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States, or CFIUS, can review and block major transactions such as mergers
or asset sales to foreign owners,22 but is ill-suited to address the gradual shift
in ownership that is occurring as Americans sell shares of stock to fund their
retirement and foreign investors buy those shares. This slow, gradual shift
in ownership raises the question: how should we ensure the decisionmakers
at U.S. companies act with U.S. interests in mind, while supporting the free
market system that led to these companies’—and America’s—success?
The remainder of this Comment discusses the severity of the threat
facing U.S. corporations, the insufficiency of current legal responses to this
threat, and a proposal to guard against this threat while preserving
opportunities for investment.
I. FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN U.S. CORPORATIONS IS DANGEROUS
Importantly, while the Starwood/Marriott example demonstrates
potential interest in interference by foreign governments, foreign actors do
not require malign motives in order to subvert U.S. interests. Even with no
malign motives, foreign shareholders may simply have different interests
than domestic shareholders or other domestic bodies, such as policymakers
or the broader public.23 The threat to U.S. companies’ governance rests on a
spectrum; at one end, foreign governments could maliciously and
intentionally abuse weaknesses in U.S. corporate law to gain influence over
U.S. companies, and at the other, individual foreign investors could simply
have interests that do not align with U.S. national security concerns.
Either of these ends of the spectrum is problematic. The threat of
malicious action by hostile foreign governments is obvious. The threat from
individual foreign investors is less clear, but significant. As mentioned
above, U.S. companies have long complained of the Chinese government
forcing them to turn over proprietary technology in exchange for access to
21. Daniel J. Rosenthal and Joshua A. Geltzer, American Retirees Are a National
Security Threat, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 2, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/02/ameri
can-retirees-are-a-national-security-threat/ [https://perma.cc/U8XV-UYVG] (“Siegel and
others predict that, as a result, by the middle of this century many U.S. companies will be
majority-owned by non-American investors.”).
22. See generally, 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 116–30)
(establishing authority for CFIUS to review such transactions).
23. See, e.g., Global Investor Study 2017: Investor behaviour: from priorities to
expectations, SCHRODERS (2017), https://www.schroders.com/en/sysglobalassets/digital/insig
hts/2017/pdf/global-investor-study-2017/theme2/schroders_report-2__eng_master.pdf [https
://perma.cc/6ATE-Z9DE] (finding varying investment priorities among citizens of different
countries).
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the Chinese market.24 From a U.S. national security perspective, transferring
sensitive technology such as semiconductors or artificial intelligence may
speed the technological advancement of a rival government. However, from
the perspective of a foreign shareholder in, say, South Africa, such a transfer
facilitates rapid growth for the corporation at minimal, or irrelevant, cost
(although, it is possible that the firm and its shareholders could still bear
long-run costs by sharing technology with potential long-run competitors).
Under either end of the spectrum, the slow accumulation of foreign
ownership of U.S. firms can threaten U.S. security interests, and there is no
provision of U.S. law to protect against it.
II. CURRENT LEGAL RESPONSES ARE INSUFFICIENT TO PROTECT
NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS
A. CFIUS is Ill-Equipped to Deal with this Threat
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS,
is the main legal mechanism to guard against potentially dangerous foreign
investment in the U.S. CFIUS was created in 1975 by executive order of
President Gerald Ford25 and given further power by the International
Investment Survey Act of 1976.26 CFIUS in its current form was created in
1988 by the Exon-Florio Amendment,27 after U.S. government officials
became concerned by U.S. companies being acquired by Japanese
companies.28 This new legislation gave the President the power to block
transactions involving foreign entities for national security purposes and
increased the reporting requirements for such foreign transactions.29
Statutes limit CFIUS review to single-transaction events such as
mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers.30 CFIUS has no direct enforcement
power; it can only recommend that the President block transactions deemed
to threaten national security.31
While CFIUS reviews “covered

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 8.
Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. § 20263 (May 7, 1975).
22 U.S.C.A. § 3101 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 116–30).
50 U.S.C.A. § 4565 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 116–30), supra note 22.
JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2018).
29. 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 116–30), supra note 22.
30. 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 116–30), supra note 22 (granting
authority for CFIUS to review large transactions such as mergers, acquisitions, and
takeovers).
31. 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 116–30), supra note 22.
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transaction[s]” (i.e. major foreign transactions)32, it is required by statute to
consider whether a given transaction is a foreign government-controlled
transaction.33 Such transactions are subject to greater scrutiny, including
longer time periods for review,34 mandatory congressional reporting
requirements,35 and public announcements of decisions by the President.36
The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 expanded
these powers, but still focuses CFIUS review on single-transaction
investments, as opposed to the current trend of gradually accumulating
shares based on thousands of small transactions.37
These powers are well-suited to closely scrutinize major transactions
mentioned in statute, such as mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers.38 For
example, had Anbang not withdrawn its offer to acquire Starwood, the deal
would have fallen within CFIUS’s purview.39 However, these CFIUS
powers are not appropriate to review gradual shifts in foreign ownership of
U.S. companies caused by slow accumulation of openly-traded shares.
CFIUS’s legal authority is limited to these major, singular-event transactions
and does not extend to reviewing shares of ownership by disparate
individuals of foreign nations, accumulated over time in an open market. So,
if a number of Chinese individuals bought shares of Starwood stock on the
exchanges, the purchases would not be subject to CFIUS review. Further,
individual review of each transaction is infeasible, given the rapid pace of
trading on today’s exchanges.40 CFIUS is simply ill-equipped to evaluate
the threat posed by gradually increasing foreign ownership shares of U.S.
companies.

32. 50 USC § 4565(a)(4)(A) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 116–30).
33. Id. at § 4565(b)(1)(B).
34. Id. at § 4565(b)(2)(C).
35. 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(3)(B).
36. 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(2).
37. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–32,
tit. XVII, Subtitle A, 132 Stat. 2289.
38. 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565, supra note 22.
39. See note 16 and accompanying text.
40. Compare Maxime Rieman, Analysis: Investors Can Receive Quality Brokerage
Execution For a Fraction of the Cost, NERDWALLET (Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.nerdwall
et.com/blog/investing/investing-data/brokerage-execution-quality/ [https://perma.cc/46JN-D
TSW] (reporting results of an analysis suggesting that many large brokers execute typical
clients’ orders during trading hours in less than one second), with Michael Reilly, HighFrequency Trading Is Nearing the Ultimate Speed Limit, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 9, 2016),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602135/high-frequency-trading-is-nearing-the-ultimat
e-speed-limit/ [https://perma.cc/U5DR-V78H] (reporting a technological development that
allows high-frequency traders to execute trades in just 85 nanoseconds).
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B. Prior Corporate Law Reform Proposals for Foreign Investors
Concerns over the right level and type of foreign investment are not
new. However, most prior literature about foreign influence in U.S.
companies has focused on the influence of sovereign wealth funds.
Sovereign wealth funds are government-owned investment vehicles, which
often invest in foreign assets.41 As these funds have become more popular,
concerns about their political influence and level of autonomy from their
sponsoring governments have prompted calls for transparency and reform.42
Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt have proposed temporarily
removing voting rights from shares owned by sovereign wealth funds, and
restoring voting rights to those shares when the shares are transferred to a
non-sovereign wealth fund owner.43 They argue this would limit voting
influence of foreign-government-controlled investment bodies, while
maintaining economic incentive to invest, since the value of the underlying
shares is unchanged for the next owner of the shares.44
Other scholars have proposed increasing taxes on sovereign wealth
funds to discourage high ownership stakes by them,45 relying on existing
securities or regulatory law,46 or relying on a voluntary code of best
practices.47 While these proposals have their merit, all are geared towards
investments by single, foreign-government-associated bodies; none address
the problem of slowly-accumulating foreign ownership amongst diffuse
foreign owners. This Comment is the first to address the lack of legal
response in light of slowly accumulating foreign ownership shares of U.S.
companies.

41. Sovereign Wealth Funds—A Work Agenda, INT’L MONETARY FUND (2008), https://w
ww.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YLA-EDJH].
42. Id.
43. Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate
Governance: A Minimalist Solution to the New Mercantilism. 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (2010).
44. Id. at 1352.
45. Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440
(2009) (noting that current law exempts sovereign wealth funds from taxation, placing these
funds at an economic advantage compared to other investors).
46. Steven M. Davidoff, Telling Friend from Foe in Foreign Investments, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 2, 2008), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/04/02/telling-friend-from-foe-in-foreigninvestments/ [https://perma.cc/7X84-VRMC] (suggesting that modifications to existing
securities law, in combination with CFIUS review, would guard against undue influence of
sovereign wealth funds).
47. Paul Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, 87 N.C. L. REV. 83, 115 (2008) (arguing for
the universal adoption of a code of best practices to guard against misfeasance in sovereign
wealth funds).
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III. THE PROPOSAL: TEMPORARILY REMOVE VOTING RIGHTS FROM
CERTAIN FOREIGN SHAREHOLDERS WHEN THEY COULD, IF
ACTING IN CONCERT, ACT AS THE CONTROLLING
SHAREHOLDER
Any solution to this threat must balance three critical factors.
First, economic progress and capital mobility. High levels of capital
mobility have been shown to improve economic growth,48 and the legal
system countries use significantly impacts a country’s capital mobility.49 Li
Sheng notes that capital mobility is associated with benefits including
economic “growth50 and competition,51 the transfer of technology and
management skill,52 the enhancement of transparency and market
discipline,53 the strengthening of efficiency at financial institutions,54 and the

48. Sebastian Edwards, Capital Mobility and Economic Performance: Are Emerging
Economies Different?, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8076, 2001),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w8076.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJZ4-5QY9] (finding that
countries with high levels of capital mobility outperform others in economic terms).
49. Laura Alfaro, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, & Vadym Volosovych, Capital Flows in a
Globalized World: The Role of Policies and Institutions, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 11696, 2005), https://www.nber.org/papers/w11696.pdf [https://perma.c
c/3XNQ-V9WK] (finding a link between a country’s legal system and its level of capital
mobility).
50. Miranda Xafa, Monetary Stability, Exchange Rate Regimes, and Capital Controls:
What have we learned?, 28 CATO JOURNAL 237 (2008); Li Sheng and Yanming Tsui, Casino
Booms and Local Politics: The City of Macao, 26 CITIES 67 (2009).
51. Li Sheng, Competing or Cooperating to Host Mega Events: A Simple Model, 27
ECONOMIC MODELLING 375 (2009); Chigon Kim, Place Promotion and Symbolic
Characterization of New Songdo City, South Korea, 27 CITIES 13 (2010).
52. Adam C. Baines, Capital Mobility, Perspectives and Central Bank Independence:
Exchange Rate Policy since 1945, 34 POLICY SCIENCES 171 (2001); Robert Musil, Global
Capital Control and City Hierarchies: An Attempt to Reposition Vienna in a World City
Network, 26 CITIES 255 (2009).
53. Juan Luo and Wenjin Tang, Capital Openness and Financial Crises: A Financial
Contagion Model with Multiple Equilibria, 10 J. OF ECON. POL’Y REFORM 283 (2007); Tim
Campbell, Learning Cities: Knowledge, Capacity and Competitiveness, 33 HABITAT INT’L
195 (2009).
54. Le Thi Thu Huong and Edsel E. Sajor, Privatization, Democratic Reforms, and
Micro-governance Change in a Transition Economy: Condominium Homeowner
Associations in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, 27 CITIES 20 (2010); Kee-Lee Chou and Nelson
W. S. Chow, The Roles of Human Capital and Social Capital in the Economic Integration of
New Arrivals from Mainland China to Hong Kong, 33 HABITAT INT’L 340 (2009).
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smoothing of consumption.55”56 Additionally, reduced capital mobility may
cause “financial instability and . . . currency crises57” (citations in original).58
Given the numerous benefits to maintaining a system of free capital mobility
and the importance of the legal regime underpinning this, any policy
solutions to protect national security must be narrowly tailored to avoid
unnecessarily increasing the difficulty of investing in the U.S.
Second, shareholder rights. A longstanding feature of U.S. corporate
law is that shareholders in a given class should be treated equally,59 though
some scholarship questions whether this is true in practice, or even whether
it should be given force at all.60 As this Comment argues, there may be
certain situations in which this baseline assumption is improper. Even so,
solutions should be narrowly tailored as to avoid unnecessary interference
with shareholder rights.
Third, national security. Protecting American security interests has
long been seen as a primary purpose of the federal government.61 In light of
rising threats around the world, these interests must be weighed against other
considerations.
These principles rule out two sweeping changes to corporate law. The
first extreme proposal would be to remove all voting rights from all foreign
shareholders in all circumstances. The second would be to expand regulation
limiting the ownership of U.S. companies by foreign shareholders, perhaps
by further restricting the limits on sensitive industries such as
telecommunications, aviation, energy, and banking.62 The economic harm
55. Graham Bird and Dane Rowlands, Catalysing Private Capital Flows and IMF
Programs: Some Remaining Questions, 11 J. OF ECON. POL’Y REFORM 37 (2008); Dilek
Özdemir, Strategic Choice for Istanbul: A Domestic or International Orientation for
Logistics?, 27 CITIES 154 (2010).
56. Li Sheng, Theorising Free Capital Mobility: The Perspective of Developing
Countries, 37 REV. OF INT’L STUD. 2519 (2011).
57. Leonardo Bartolini and Allan Drazen, When Liberal Policies Reflect External Shocks,
What do We Learn?, 42 J. OF INT’L ECON. 249 (1997); Shigeto Kitano, Capital Controls,
Public Debt and Currency Crises, 90 J. OF ECON. 117 (2007).
58. See Sheng, supra note 56.
59. Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and
Reorganizations, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1072 (1983) (noting the proposition that “all shares of a
particular class (e.g., common stock) are to be treated as homogeneous claims on enterprise
wealth”).
60. James D. Cox, Equal Treatment of Shareholders: An Essay, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 615
(1997) (citing various examples of corporate law moving away from equality of shareholders).
61. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (defining a central purpose of the U.S. Constitution as to
“provide for the common defense”), see also THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton)
(arguing that a federal government is necessary for “the common defense of its members; the
preservation of the public peace as well against internal convulsions as external attacks”).
62. MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33103, FOREIGN INVESTMENT
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caused by strict foreign ownership limit is highlighted by Vietnam’s recent
decision to remove its 49% foreign ownership cap on its companies (though
caps remain for industries deemed critical to national security, like aviation),
which analysts described as handicapping foreign investment, distorting
economic incentives, and restricting economic growth.63 Removing
shareholders’ voting rights would necessarily reduce the value of those
shares, because presumably, some investors by the stock with the intent to
vote on the affairs of the company. Without the ability to do so, the incentive
to own the stock will be decreased. This is likely to suppress the value of
other shares as well, as it limits the buyer pool for a given company’s shares.
Further, it is possible that removing voting rights of shares someone already
owns is illegal and violates their due process rights. Any change to
shareholder voting rights must be tailored as narrowly as possible, while still
achieving its national security aims, in order to avoid unnecessary economic
harm to shareholders and resulting economic harms to society.
For similar reasons, capping foreign investment in certain industries,
such as those to which CFIUS already applies a more intensive standard of
review, is undesirable. This would similarly depress the value of all shares
of stock by curtailing the pool of available buyers and hindering capital
mobility. It also interferes with shareholder rights by increasing the
difficulty of selling shares. Rather than these sweeping measures, this
Comment proposes a more targeted intervention that still meets U.S. national
security needs.
This proposed solution contains three key elements:
1. Companies should be required to disclose their ownership by
shareholders’ countries of domicile.
2. CFIUS should be granted authority to designate companies and
countries subject to higher scrutiny.
3. If shareholders of any one company, from one country, could
become the company’s controlling shareholder by acting in concert, those
shareholders should temporarily be restricted from voting until that bloc
would no longer be the controlling shareholder.
These provisions, together, expand the powers of CFIUS to ensure that
foreign investment in the U.S. continues, but in a manner that safeguards
U.S. national security. It is tailored to be as limited in scope as possible,
while still achieving its national security aims.

IN THE UNITED STATES: MAJOR FEDERAL STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS

(2013).
63. Vietnam to remove 49% foreign ownership cap on listed companies, NIKKEI ASIAN
REV. (Oct. 10, 2018), https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Vietnam-to-remove-49-foreign-owne
rship-cap-on-listed-companies [https://perma.cc/AEE5-WR3F].
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A. Mandatory disclosure of ownership by country
While aggregate data about how much U.S. stock is held by foreign
shareholders exists, little is known about specific companies. This is
troubling, considering that the CFIUS review process suggests that foreign
ownership of certain companies or industries may be more problematic than
others.64 As a first step, the U.S. should mandate that all publicly traded
companies disclose how many of their shares are owned by U.S. versus
foreign shareholders.
Current disclosure laws require the disclosure of many important pieces
of information: registration statements containing information about new
security issuances,65 annual66 and quarterly67 financial reporting, major
developments,68 proxy statements,69 and stock ownership by officers and
directors,70 among others. They also must disclose major individual
shareholders,71 which could provide information about major foreign
shareholders above the required threshold. This requires disclosure of major
shareholders’ identity, background, purpose of transaction, and citizenship.72
This requirement should be extended to provide a complete view of foreign
ownership, including ownership by smaller shareholders. While the
individual holdings of each shareholder are not important, the aggregate
breakdown of U.S. versus foreign ownership is critical. Importantly, since
many shareholders’ shares are held by custodian banks or brokers,73 this
requirement would have to apply to the shares’ beneficial owner, not the
record owner.
Notably, the U.S. Congress is already considering enacting such a

64. See 31 C.F.R. § Pt. 800, Annex B (listing a number of industries now subject to higher
scrutiny under CFIUS because of their importance to national security, such as aircraft,
semiconductor, and weapons manufacturing, energy production and storage,
telecommunications, and nanotechnology, among others).
65. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10 (2010).
66. 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2010).
67. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (2010).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2010).
69. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a) (2010).
70. 17 C.F.R. § 249.103, §§ 249.104, 249.105 (2010).
71. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a) (2010) (requiring companies to disclose any shareholder
holding 5% or more of the company).
72. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2010) (requiring disclosure of key information, including,
among others, the shareholder’s name, source of funds, and citizenship or place of
organization).
73. The Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation is one of the largest such
clearinghouses. THE DEPOSITORY TRUST AND CLEARING CORPORATION, http://www.dtcc.com
/ [https://perma.cc/85TG-KER2] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
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beneficial-owner-disclosure requirement. The House of Representatives
passed a bill requiring corporations, LLCs, and other entities to register their
beneficial owners each year with the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network.74 Similar requirements are being debated in a Senate bill.75 This
disclosure requirement may soon become law in the United States.
The beneficial-owner requirement is especially important in light of the
number of entities which own U.S. equities through offshore investment
vehicles (through the Cayman Islands, for example). However, reporting the
nationality of those shareholders is already required under the laws of many
other nations and associated treaties with the United States. For example,
consider the Cayman Islands’ laws requiring disclosure of financial vehicles’
beneficial owners. In 2005, the Cayman Islands passed the Tax Information
Authority Law to implement the Tax Information Exchange Agreement
treaty with the United States and United Kingdom.76 This law requires the
Cayman Islands to share information about beneficial owners of Cayman
Islands financial vehicles with the United States and United Kingdom for tax
purposes, including the beneficial owner’s country of domicile.77 The
Proceeds of Crime Law78 and Terrorism Law79 require the disclosure of
beneficial owners of these financial vehicles for anti-money-laundering and
anti-terrorism-financing purposes, and require a “know-your-customer”
requirement similar to what the U.S. has required of its financial
institutions.80 Accordingly, the Beneficial Ownership Regulations require
disclosure of the beneficial owners of major Cayman Islands entities, again
including the owners’ domiciles.81 Information about offshore financing
74. Corporate Transparency Act of 2019, H.R. 2513, 116th Cong. (2019).
75. ILLICIT CASH Act, S. 2563, 116th Cong. (2019).
76. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-1028SP, CAYMAN ISLANDS: REVIEW OF
CAYMAN ISLANDS AND U.S. LAWS APPLICABLE TO U.S. PERSONS’ FINANCIAL ACTIVITY IN THE
CAYMAN ISLANDS (2008).
77. Tax Information Authority (International Tax Compliance) (Country-By-Country
Reporting) Regulations, CAYMAN ISLANDS, (2017), http://www.gov.ky/portal/pls/portal/docs/
1/12554414.PDF [https://perma.cc/CR93-4K47].
78. Proceeds of Crime Law, CAYMAN ISLANDS, (2017), https://www.cima.ky/upimages/
commonfiles/1499349646ProceedsofCrimeLaw2017Revision.PDF [https://perma.cc/4WM
W-9S8F].
79. Terrorism Law, CAYMAN ISLANDS, (2018), https://www.cima.ky/upimages/common
files/TerrorismLaw2018Revision_1524077980.PDF [https://perma.cc/EU2E-8U6V].
80. These requirements were put in place by the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act and have been
updated and amended several times since then. Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT
ACT) Act of 2001, 107 Pub. L. No. 56, 115 Stat 272 (2001).
81. Beneficial Ownership (Companies) (Amendment) Regulations, CAYMAN ISLANDS,
(2018), http://www.gov.ky/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/12600381.PDF [https://perma.cc/J8AZ-E
NM7].
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vehicles’ beneficial owners is currently available for a variety of purposes,
and access to this information should be expanded to facilitate individual
companies’ disclosure of foreign versus domestic ownership.
Requiring reporting is unlikely to affect the actual economic value of
each share or substantively alter the stock price. It alone does not change
shareholder rights and would enable further study of national security threats
posed by foreign ownership of U.S. companies. The U.S. Congress should
swiftly enact the legislation currently in progress to require this reporting.
Critics of this proposal may argue that it would raise privacy concerns,
encourage shareholders to shroud true ownership through a complex web of
trusts or corporations, or be costly to implement given the large number of
shareholders that already use trusts or other mechanisms to cloud the true
owners of the shares. However, some disclosure of major shareholders’
domicile, as well as those investing through many offshore entities, is
already required today, and more disclosure may be required in the future
regardless of this proposal.82 Expanding this disclosure to facilitate an
aggregate ownership percentage by country for each publicly-traded
company would not meaningfully increase the disclosure required or
available in today’s financial ecosystem. On the contrary, it would aid
officials as they make determinations about which companies and sectors of
the economy posed potential risks of foreign interference.
B. Expanded CFIUS authority
Because CFIUS review is currently limited to large-scale transactions,83
it is not equipped to review large numbers of individual stock purchases and
sales. Further, such review would be logistically infeasible given the rapid
pace of many stock trades in today’s markets.84 Rather than solely having
the ability to scrutinize individual trades after the fact, CFIUS should be
given the authority to preemptively declare certain companies or industries
that are critical for national security and are subject to more intensive review.
This list could be similar to the list CFIUS already uses to review large-scale
transactions, which includes industries such as aerospace, semiconductor,
and weapons manufacturing; energy production and storage;
telecommunications; and nanotechnology; among others.85
82. See supra notes 74, 76–81,.
83. 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565, supra note 22 (establishing authority for CFIUS to review large
transactions such as mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers).
84. See Reilly, supra note 40.
85. 31 C.F.R. § Pt. 800, Annex B, supra note 64. See also 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565, supra
note 22 (establishing CFIUS power to review transactions that place critical infrastructure or
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CFIUS should also be able to designate those countries whose
ownership of U.S. firms will be subject to scrutiny. Expanding review to all
countries would be unnecessary, considering that certain countries, such as
China, have already exhibited a willingness to interfere in the affairs of U.S.
corporations, while other nations, such as close American allies have not
exhibited such a threat.86 Considering the economic harms of a too-broad
proposal, it is important that CFIUS has the authority to limit this scrutiny to
the smallest number of countries necessary.
C. Restrictions on voting rights of a potentially controlling bloc of
shareholders
A bloc of shareholders from a country deemed by CFIUS to deserve a
higher level of scrutiny becomes problematic if the bloc, acting in concert,
would be the company’s controlling shareholder. This would allow the bloc
to control major company decisions, such as mergers with foreign
competitors (which would be subject to CFIUS review)87, joint ventures
(which would not, unless it were a joint venture designed to result in control
of the target company)88, entry into foreign markets and attendant technology
transfers, investment decisions, product launches or cancellations, and so
forth. If it is possible for these shareholders, acting in concert, to influence
the company’s decision, it is possible for one of two things to happen. One,
their government could coerce them into voting a certain way or could
manipulate a proxy contest. Two, the shareholders themselves could make
these decisions without considering the same set of factors a U.S. investor
would. As noted above, both ends of this spectrum are problematic.89
For this reason, voting rights of these shareholders should be
temporarily suspended, until they would no longer be the controlling
shareholder if acting in concert. This proposal would only apply to
shareholders in countries highlighted by CFIUS as deserving additional
scrutiny, when holding shares of companies in industries similarly
highlighted by CFIUS. As with Gilson and Milhaupt’s proposed reform in
the sovereign wealth fund context, these voting rights would be restored
when the shares are sold to a shareholder in a non-sensitive industry-country
technology at risk, or allow foreign persons to conduct surveillance on U.S. government
property or activities).
86. See supra notes 8, 12–17 and accompanying text.
87. 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565, supra note 22.
88. 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565(a)(4)(B)(i) (limiting scrutiny of joint ventures to a “takeover
carried out through a joint venture”).
89. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
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combination, which would preserve the economic value of the shares.90
Importantly, current CFIUS regulations already emphasize the
importance of determining what constitutes “control.” These regulations
define “control” as:
[The] power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, through
the ownership of a majority or a dominant minority of the total
outstanding voting interest in an entity, board representation,
proxy voting, a special share, contractual arrangements, formal or
informal arrangements to act in concert, or other means, to
determine, direct, or decide important matters affecting an entity;
in particular, but without limitation, to determine, direct, take,
reach, or cause decisions regarding the [matters listed in §
800.208(a)], or any other similarly important matters affecting an
entity.91
When this definition was originally promulgated, the Treasury
Department noted that these regulations “eschew bright lines” and do not
rely on “a specified percentage of shares or number of board seats,” but
rather consider “all relevant factors.”92 “Control” is a nebulous concept that
depends on the circumstances of each case. This proposal does not change
how CFIUS defines “control,” but simply extends the concept of “control”
to a group of shareholders potentially acting in concert.
This test would be similar to current SEC regulations defining
beneficial ownership in cases of shareholders acting together. Current
regulations mandate that “[w]hen two or more persons agree to act together
for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting or disposing of equity
securities” the shareholders are deemed to have acquired beneficial
ownership of the other shares, which then triggers additional reporting
requirements.93 The American Law Institute defines a “controlling
shareholder” as a person who “either alone or pursuant to an arrangement or
understanding with one or more other persons” owns 50% of voting shares
or “otherwise exercises a controlling influence” over the corporation.94 The
ALI also notes that once a shareholder or group of shareholders achieves a
25% voting stake, it is presumed to “exercise a controlling influence,”
90. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
91. 31 C.F.R. § 800.208.
92. Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons;
Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 70704 (Nov. 21, 2008), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/in
ternational/foreign-investment/Documents/CFIUS-Final-Regulations-new.pdf [https://perma
.cc/5TB5-GETM].
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5.
94. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
1.10(a) (Am. Law Inst. 1994).
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though this presumption can be rebutted.95 Additionally, several leading
treatises note that groups of shareholders, when combining to control the
corporation or when acting in concert, may be considered the controlling
shareholder of the corporation and thus trigger fiduciary duties.96 This
principle has been recognized in federal,97 Delaware,98 and several other state
courts.99
Such a proposal requires a body charged with enforcement and a forum
for adjudicating disputes to protect shareholders’ due process rights. An
expanded CFIUS would be the logical choice as an enforcement body, given
its experience and expertise evaluating “control,” and proceedings could
continue in specially designed CFIUS administrative proceedings, in another
body’s administrative proceedings (such as the SEC), or through the federal
court system. It is critical that there is some mechanism for shareholders to
appeal any decision to minimize the risk of an over-aggressive designation
by CFIUS. Because there is no singular cutoff for what constitutes a
“controlling shareholder,” but rather, control depends on the circumstances
of each case,100 such disputes are highly likely and even beneficial, as the
process would both safeguard shareholder rights and in time, provide
precedent for defining “control” in this context. To further safeguard against
overzealous designations by CFIUS, CFIUS or whatever body brings the
action to remove shareholders’ voting rights should bear the burden of proof
that the bloc of shareholders would, in fact, be the controlling shareholder if
acting in concert.
Taken together, such policy adjustments serve to strengthen the U.S.’s
ability to confront potentially nefarious actions by foreign governments,
which may seek to exercise control or influence over critical U.S. companies
and sensitive technology. But even in the absence of nefarious intent, these
95. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
1.10(b) (Am. Law Inst. 1994).
96. See, e.g. § 5765.Forms of majority holdings—Control by combination of
shareholders, 12B Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 5765 (“Ordinarily, some of the shareholders may
combine to control the corporation. If they do combine for such purpose and actually control
the acts of the corporation, they are generally considered fiduciaries . . . .”).
97. Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389, 396 (6th Cir. 1954) (noting that a “group of
stockholders” may qualify as the controlling shareholder and owe fiduciary duties to other
shareholders).
98. Kennedy v. Venrock Associates, 348 F.3d 584, 590–91 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying
Delaware law).
99. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661–65 (Mass.
1976) (applying the principle in Massachusetts), Frank v. Getty, 29 Misc. 2d 115, 116 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1961) (applying the principle in New York), Locati v. Johnson, 160 Or. App. 63, 69
(O.R. Ct. App. 1999) (applying the principle in Oregon).
100. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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adjustments ensure that foreign investors with less-direct interest in U.S.
national security do not control a U.S. company’s decisions.
This proposal accomplishes this goal with minimal impact on
shareholder rights and capital mobility. In the vast majority of situations,
this proposal would leave shareholder rights and the value of their shares,
untouched. Only in specific situations where CFIUS identifies a threat from
a specific country-company combination would any voting rights be
adjusted. Further, the economic value tied to those shares would not change.
The shares would retain rights to dividends, and this proposal would not
change the value of the shares to another buyer, whose voting rights would
be restored upon transfer of the sale. This solution achieves its aim of
protecting U.S. national security with minimum interference in the capital
markets.
IV. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS: INCREASING PROTECTIONISM, RAISING
THE RISK OF RETALIATION BY OTHER NATIONS, AND
INTERFERING WITH SHAREHOLDER EQUALITY
Some readers may be alarmed by proposals to interfere with the rights
of shareholders absent compelling evidence of its necessity. Others may be
disturbed by the potential repercussions of the proposal, such as increasing
protectionism or daring other nations to retaliate. Each of these objections
is addressed below.
A. Shareholder equality
Typically, U.S. corporate law seeks to ensure that all shareholders in a
given class are treated equally.101 However, there are already exceptions to
this principle, where corporate law acknowledges that the benefits of
discrimination against some shareholders outweigh the cost. For example,
poison pill defenses to takeovers are recognized as acceptable in many
situations,102 even though poison pills afford extra rights to the target
company’s shareholders at the expense of the acquirer’s shares.103 The
general theory is that discrimination against the acquirer’s shares is justified
by the need to protect the target company.104
101. See Brudney, supra note 59.
102. See, e.g., Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1357 (Del. 1985)
(upholding the legality of poison pill defenses).
103. JAMES D. COX AND THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 4 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 23:7 (3D ED. 2018) (defining poison pills).
104. Id. See also Moran, 500 A.2d at 102.
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Other exceptions to the principle of shareholder equality exist as well.
Delaware imposes additional duties on controlling shareholders, which are
generally viewed as fiduciaries and owe additional duties to other
shareholders.105 Corporations may grant additional liquidity provisions to
shares held by an employee stock ownership plan that shares of the same
class held by non-employees do not receive.106 They may also enact “tenure
voting” schemes, whereby longer-tenured shareholders receive additional
voting power than shorter-tenured shareholders within the same class.107
Thus, U.S. corporate law already recognizes exceptions to the general
principle of equality of shareholders within a given class, each of which is
thought to be justified by a compelling rationale for departing from the equal
treatment norm. This proposal simply adds another exception to this list,
with an important reason – the security of the nation. Simply put, “[i]t is well
established in our jurisprudence that stockholders need not always be treated
equally for all purposes.”108
B. Protectionism
Restricting voting rights of foreign shareholders may be viewed as
protectionist, as it discriminates against the voting power of some
shareholders based on national affiliation. Similar proposals to limit voting
rights of sovereign wealth funds have been criticized as such, and Gilson and
Milhaupt’s response is apt in this new context as well:
Some may perceive our proposal as protectionist. But to do so is
to misconstrue the impact of vote suspension. . . . [U]nlike a truly
protectionist measure designed to protect domestic companies’
commercial interests rather than the integrity of the structure of a
form of capitalism, our proposal would not lower investment
values for foreign investors on account of their nationality or
sovereign affiliation per se.109
This measure would only be “protectionist” if it reduced the value of
the foreign shareholders’ shares. But since the suspension of their voting
rights is only temporary – voting rights would be restored when sold to a
shareholder from a country not identified as problematic by CFIUS – the
value of their shares would remain, and they would retain their economic
105. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987)
(noting that controlling shareholders are fiduciaries).
106. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376–77 (Del. 1993).
107. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1370–71 (Del. 1996).
108. Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1376.
109. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 43, at 1353.
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incentive to invest in the U.S. Temporary vote suspension is actually the
least-protectionist method of reducing foreign influence on U.S. companies.
C. Potential retaliation by other nations
Lastly, some readers may be concerned that U.S. action to limit the
power of foreign investors may spark retaliation from other countries. First,
as discussed below, this concern overestimates the probability of retaliation.
Second, retaliation is less likely to cause severe economic harm for the U.S.
than many assume.
The current global policy landscape includes increased scrutiny of
foreign investments, which may prompt some fear of retaliation if the U.S.
strengthens its review of foreign investments beyond its 2018 revision to
CFIUS powers.110 The European Union recently passed legislation enacting
their own review of foreign direct investment.111 Australia,112 Canada,113
Japan,114 and China115 have similar regulations in place.
Note, however, that many of these countries have instituted their
regimes to restrict investment from China in order to protect their national
security,116 while China recently enacted a new law that would make it more
110. See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, supra note 37.
111. Council Directive No. 72/18 of 20 February 2019, Regulation of the European
Parliament and of The Council establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct
investments into the Union.
112. See Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975, 1975 (Austl.); see also Foreign
Acquisitions and Takeovers Fees Imposition Act 2015, 2015, (Austl.).
113. See Investment Canada Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 28 (1st Supp.) (Can.).
114. See Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, Act No. 228 of (December 1, 1949)
(Japan).
115. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waizi Qiye Fa (中华人民共和国外资企业法)
[the Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprise Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated
by the Congress of the People’s Republic of China, effective Apr. 12, 1968) THE NAT’L
PEOPLE’S CONGR. OF CHINA; see also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezi Jingying
Qiye Fa (中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法) [the Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture
Enterprise Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 5th Nat’l People’s
Cong., effective July 1, 1979, amended Mar. 15, 2001) MINISTRY OF COMMERCE; Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezuo Jingying Qiye Fa (中华人民共和国中外合作经营企
业法), Congress of the People’s Republic of China (全国人民代表大会) [the Sino-Foreign
Cooperative Joint Venture Enterprise Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated
by the 7th Nat’l People’s Cong., effective Apr. 13, 1988, am’d Oct. 31, 2000) THE NAT’L
PEOPLE’S CONGR. OF CHINA.
116. See, e.g. Thilo Hanemann, Mikko Huotari, and Agatha Kratz, Chinese FDI in
Europe: 2018 Trends and Impact of New Screening Policies, RHODIUM GROUP (Mar. 6, 2019),
https://rhg.com/research/chinese-fdi-in-europe-2018-trends-and-impact-of-new-screeningpolicies/ [https://perma.cc/F8RY-AHRE] (noting that the recent EU investment screening
framework is in part intended to apply greater scrutiny to Chinese investment); Alexandra
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open to foreign investment, though its trade dispute with the U.S. remains
ongoing.117 Under this comment’s proposal, no voting rights would be
changed absent designation from CFIUS; presumably, the current trend of
higher wariness towards Chinese investments than towards investment from
Western nations will continue. If so, retaliation would be less likely from
other Western nations and more likely from China. Prior to the recent trade
dispute with the U.S., however, China began taking some steps to open its
economy.118 And while the ongoing trade dispute demonstrated China’s
willingness to retaliate against U.S. economic or trade policy, the “Phase
One” trade deal also demonstrates that détente is possible despite broad
issues in the dispute being unresolved as of this writing.119
If retaliation does occur after the U.S. implements this proposal, the
effects will likely be less harmful than many assume. Consider a world in
which every nation implements the proposal described here. Restrictions on
voting rights would only occur when a specific country designates specific
country-company combinations to receive greater scrutiny and demonstrates
that shareholders of that country could actually act as the controlling
shareholder, if acting in concert. Very few companies would be affected by
this. Shareholders of the small number of affected companies would not be
significantly affected either, as only their voting rights change, but the
underlying value of the stock does not change, since voting rights would be
restored once the shares are sold to a shareholder of another country. The
risks of retaliation, while important to consider, are likely to be less harmful
than some might assume, if retaliation does occur. Of course, policymakers
should regularly reevaluate changing circumstances to make informed
judgments about retaliation risk.
V. CONCLUSION
Foreign ownership of U.S. companies is increasing. In general, this
Yoon-Hendricks, Congress Strengthens Reviews of Chinese and Other Foreign Investments,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2018) (noting that many U.S. government officials supported the Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act in order to limit problematic investment from
China).
117. Foreign Investment Law of the People’s Republic of China (2019), THE NAT’L
PEOPLE’S CONGR. OF CHINA, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2019-12/31/content_54654
49.htm [https://perma.cc/QP8C-9ZLW].
118. Id.
119. Shawn Donnan, Josh Wingrove, and Saleha Mohsin, U.S. and China Sign Phase One
of Trade Deal, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articl
es/2020-01-15/u-s-china-sign-phase-one-of-trade-deal-trump-calls-remarkable [https://perm
a.cc/ZQK6-ERW7].
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increased foreign investment is a positive trend for U.S. companies and
workers, but left unchecked, it presents dangerous national security threats.
As nefarious actors on the world stage seek to use U.S. corporate law to their
advantage, the U.S. must ensure that corporate law serves the broader
national interest. To protect against this influence, the U.S. should
strengthen the CFIUS review process to consider the changing nature of
foreign investment in the U.S. and the slow accumulation of foreign
ownership of U.S. companies.

